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INTRODUCTION
It has become almost a cliché to argue that the behavior and performance of rms only can be understood fully by examining their social, technological, and exchange relationships with other economic agents. The image of atomistic agents competing for pro ts in impersonal markets has become increasingly inadequate in view of the explosion of inter-rm collaboration the past two to three decades, as well as the growing empirical evidence formally substantiating the in uence of the social context in which rms are embedded on their conduct and performance (Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000) .
Perhaps the most important aspect of the social context of an organization's environment is its social network of external contacts. A social network can be de ned as a set of nodes linked by a set of social relationships of a speci ed type (Gulati, 1998) . It is argued that the kind of networks in which the rm is embedded and its position in these networks a ect the rm's behavior and performance. Reminiscent of the resourcebased view of the rm -which emphasized the potential for enduring bene ts to an organization from a collection of resources that is inimitable and not readily substitutable (Peteraf, 1993) -network scholars now argue that a rm's network relationships can themselves create unique and non-substitutable value and allow access to the inimitable resources and capabilities of other rms.
In other words, networks bestow the rm with "network resources," which are equivalent to the idea of "social capital" in an organizational setting (Gulati, 1999) . The rm's stock of relational or social capitalnetwork resources emanating from prior relationships with other organizations -is argued to qualify as a resource. Other resources joining with relational or social capital are technical capital -capabilities to create new technologies, products, processes -and commercial capital -complementary assets required to commercialize new technologies and obtain rents (Kale et al., 2000) . Each of these asset stocks adds value, is accumulated over time, and, most importantly, is di cult to trade across markets. As 1. The analysis of network in uence on members' strategy must pay attention to both issues of cognition (information, learning) and governance. 2. Network structure is an emergent phenomenon, very much a function of the context in which the network is called to operate.
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The following sections of the chapter survey and synthesize important concepts of interest to the analysis of innovation networks. We draw on recent conceptual developments in the business and sociological literature regarding social capital/network resources, information/learning, network governance, network emergence, and network structure optimality and discuss their in uence on rm strategy in industrial sectors characterized by rapidly changing technologies.
SOCIAL CAPITAL -NETWORK RESOURCES
Sociologists distinguish between social capital and human capital (Burt, 1992 (Burt, , 1997 Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Coleman, 1990) . Social capital is a quality created between people, whereas human capital is a quality of individuals. Social capital is, in a sense, the contextual complement to human capital: returns to human capital attributes such as intelligence, education, and seniority depend in part on the person's location in the social structure of a market or hierarchy. While human capital refers to individual ability, social capital refers to opportunity. Individuals with more social capital get higher returns to their human capital because they are positioned to identify and develop more rewarding opportunities. Consequently, the investments to build social capital are di erent from the investments that build human capital (Coleman, 1988 (Coleman, , 1990 .
Scholars have conceptualized social capital as a set of social resources embedded in relationships as well as the norms and values associated with social relationships (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Walker et al., 1997) . The broad view of social capital encompasses many aspects of a social context, such as social ties, trust relations, and value systems that facilitate actions of individuals located within that context (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) . Drawing on Granovetter (1992) and others, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1997) have distinguished between the structural, the relational, and the cognitive dimensions of social capital. The structural dimension includes social interaction: the location of an actor's contacts in a social structure of interactions provides certain advantages to the actor. The relational dimension refers to assets that are rooted in these relationships, such as trust and trustworthiness. The cognitive dimension refers to attributes like a shared paradigm that facilitates a common understanding of collective goals and proper ways of acting in a social system. This dimension captures the essence of what Coleman (1990) described as "the public good aspect of social capital."
The three dimensions of social capital are interlinked (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) . Social interaction ties (structural dimension) may stimulate trust and perceived trustworthiness (relational dimension). For example, an agent in a central network position can be perceived as more trustworthy by other agents. Common values and a shared vision of collective goals and aspirations (cognitive dimension) may also encourage the development of trust relationships. Finally, social interaction plays a critical role both in shaping a common set of goals and values and in the sharing of those goals and values among network members.
The social capital of individuals is akin to the network resources of rms (Walker et al., 1997) . According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 119) , Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.
And, according to Coleman (1988) , social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production. Because purposive organizations can be actors ("corporate actors") just as persons can, relations among corporate actors can constitute capital for them as well.
Distinct from other rm-speci c resources, network resources reside in the formal and informal inter-organizational networks in which rms are embedded and can be utilized by the rm for strategic conception and implementation. The available network resources can in uence rms' strategic behavior by altering the opportunity set available to them. The investments necessary to create and maintain network resources are distinct from the investments to create and maintain rm-speci c resources.
NETWORK INFLUENCE ON MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
The literature has recognized two channels of network in uence on members (Gulati, 1998) . The rst relates to informational bene ts obtained through network ties and positioning. The second relates to control bene ts that are generated by being more advantageously positioned in the network GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11739 -EE -MALERBA:M1842 -MALERBA TEXT or by being part of a tightly knit network. Although analytically di erent, these two bene ts also overlap signi cantly since the control bene ts largely emanate from the possession and manipulation of information.
Informational Bene ts of Networks (Cognition)
The information bene ts of network embeddedness have been summarized by Burt (1992) as access, timing, and referrals. Access refers to information about current and potential partners regarding their assets, capabilities, and trustworthiness. Timing means having the information at the right time. Referrals apply to information, passed through indirect links, about other organizations with which the rm has not had direct contact and about market or technological developments of interest. The location of a rm in a network is important for the referral component: advantageous location means that indirect referrals of partners and of their activities will ow faster and more reliably (through triangulation) than if the company was located in the network's fringes. The speci c network location, in other words, confers di erent degrees of information. Powell et al. (1996) argue that when knowledge that brings competitive advantage is widely distributed, inter-organizational collaborative networks become the locus of innovation. While internal capabilities, both for the creation of new knowledge and for the absorption of knowledge produced externally, are of vital importance, networks serve in such cases as innovation loci because they provide timely access to resources and to knowledge that are otherwise unattainable, and test internal learning capabilities. In addition to innovation-related knowledge, rms learn to operate synergistically and develop routines to that e ect. They learn how to transfer technology across partnerships and how to locate themselves in advantageous network positions that enable them to keep abreast of pertinent scienti c and technological developments. As stated in Powell et al. (1996) "collaboration is both an admission ticket to an information network and a vehicle for rapid communication of news about opportunities and obstacles".
Organizations learn which collaborations to pursue, how to function in the context of multiple collaborative ventures, and how to adapt their cooperative strategies in the midst of dynamically evolving network structures, a competency that becomes particularly important in high technology elds where frequent scienti c and technological advances change the relative bene ts of di erent forms of collaboration. Collaboration becomes, then, emergent (Kogut, 2000) . Learning from prior experience makes collaboration between parties easier (cheaper) to uphold because of the continuous re nement of collaboration routines and the attainment of partnering reputations.
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Relational embeddedness
The concept of relational embeddedness (Rowley et al., 2000) can be traced back to the original de nition of tie strength for individual actor networks proposed by Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , p. 1361 : "[A] combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual con ding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie." Extended to interorganizational alliance networks, tie strength translates into broader and deeper commitment in terms of both actual investment and investment in the relationship. Traditional equity joint ventures may be considered as an example of strong inter-organizational ties.
Strong ties have been associated in the literature with the exchange of high-quality, complex information, as well as tacit knowledge. These ties imply a ner mutual understanding of partners' operations and deeper interpenetration of each others' organizational boundaries (Uzzi, 1996) . In contrast, weak ties were proposed by Granovetter as the appropriate means for accessing new information. He argued that weak ties are more likely to serve as local bridges between relatively disconnected areas of the network and connect the agent with others that possess unique information (thus, implying more of a search activity than an exploitation activity).
Tie strength also relates to network structure and is discussed further in the relevant section below. Both tie strength and network structure are relevant also to network governance, the subject of which is addressed later on, as well. Burt (1992) distinguished conceptually between tie strength and tie density. He argued that when the objective is to access new knowledge, tie density (strong network interconnection) creates redundancy. He suggested that e ciency in accessing knowledge improves by shedding redundant ties in favor of establishing selective ties that bridge "structural holes" (empty spaces in the network).
Structural embeddedness
It is now well understood that the information passing through networks is in uenced by each participant's position in the network structure (Powell et al., 1996) . Di erential location in a network results in rms having divergent capabilities for bene ting from information ows. Firms with more experience in collaborating can better locate themselves in information-rich positions in the network with access to a more diverse set of activities. More central positioning, locally or globally, generates visibility and reputation, and thus facilitates timely access to information and resources. Firms more centrally located should have more timely access to promising new opportunities and ventures. Their experience should also result in better capabilities to bene t from further relationships.
Put di erently, the status of an organization in the network a ects its reputation and visibility in the system. The signaling properties of status are particularly important in uncertain environments: if partner status enhances their own attractiveness, organizations will have a tendency to seek high-status partners (Podolny, 1993; Podolny and Page, 1998; Podolny et al., 1996) . 1 Research has shown that rms with larger sets of network ties and more central network locations are more likely to be part of new ties, and this seems to hold for various types of networks including partnerships, patent citation networks, and top management teams. Each network highlights a di erent underlying social process that enables central rms to enter alliances more frequently (Gulati, 1998; Wagner et al., 2004) .
Control Bene ts of Networks (Governance)
Coleman (1988) proposed that a dense structure with strong ties enables a build up of reputation and social capital in the form of trust and shared social norms across network members.
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For the same reasons, Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Oliver (2001) argued that rms embedded in highly interconnected networks develop shared behavioral expectations. Consequently, like strong ties, dense networks create a mechanism of control of social relations in inter-organizational networks. According to Rowley et al. (2000) , strong ties create trust at the dyadic level by producing goodwill between partners based on interdependence and a history of reciprocity and mutual forbearance. Dense structures also serve as mechanisms of norm creation at the network level as rms are confronted with established customs, higher collective ability to punish disobedience, and expectations that the network will produce e ective incentives for cooperation, and facilitate collective monitoring and sanctioning. The above also agrees with posited concepts of organizational cognition and organizational culture (Nooteboom and Gilsing, 2004) . Organizational culture is an institutional arrangement that enables and constrains actions and sense-making, and includes both relations of power and processes of exclusion (Contu and Wilmott, 2003) . Kogut and Zander (1996) and Nooteboom (1992) have argued that organizations set cognitive frameworks for guiding attention, perception and interpretation, and for setting behavioral rules, constraining opportunism, building trust, and limiting and resolving con icts of interest. Norms and values of behavior tend to be internalized by people as part of their tacit knowledge, and are assimilated, to a greater or lesser extent, in socialization and habituation. It is important to notice that the stronger the ties and the denser the set of relationships, the more tightly knit is the network and the more it resembles an organization. The more, then, it tends to create its own culture that both enables and constrains interpretations and actions, and that includes relations of power and processes of exclusion for deterrence of deviant behavior.
Governance and network control are important as they a ect the cost of operating the network directly. Dense networks with strong ties and di used norms and expectations project high degrees of built-up social capital. The cost of participation for incumbents is fairly low given the following characteristics: wide spread of information and signi cant trust among members; the low chance of opportunistic behavior as a result of lock-in in a relationship with high relation-speci c investments; high switching costs; and the ability to control the damage from spillovers.
The dark side of dense (tight) networks is that they may lock in an organization with a group that may prove not to have been the best choice, in organizational or technological terms. More on this below.
NETWORK STRUCTURE
In an eloquent paper, Kogut (2000) argued that network structure is emergent in the initial conditions of a speci c industry, including the inherent characteristics of the relevant technologies, and the norms and institutional factors that help generate rules that guide the competitive/ cooperative behavior of rms in that industry. The argument runs on the elaboration of the characteristics of variety and specialization that are antithetical within the rm but complementary within the network. Using the parallelism of the market and the network, Kogut argues that they basically serve a similar purpose: achieving variety through specialization in the division of labor. The division of labor is the result of a dynamic learning process of individual agents ( rms) who specialize (focus) in order to create competence. Firms can be considered social communities that enable specialization in the creation and replication of partly tacit, partly explicit organizing principles of work. The boundary between the rm and the network (market) is determined by the internal cost of production and management relative to the costs of market search and procurement (Coase, 1937) . At some point, the internal management of variety in the GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11739 -EE -MALERBA:M1842 -MALERBA TEXT rm becomes more expensive than sourcing variety from the external market/network.
A network is, then, a collection of rms, each ensconced in an identity that supports specialization and a dynamic of learning and exploration. But the network, unlike the rm, does not consist of an authority relationship that can enforce an organizational structure on its members. (Kogut, 2000, p. 409) Network structure emerges in a self-organizing process from the initial conditions of a speci c industry, the characteristics of the relevant technologies, and the norms and institutional factors that help generate rules that guide rm behavior. Behavioral rules and network structure are embraced in an interactive relationship: as rules generate the structure of the network, network structure in uences subsequent behavior. The emergent structure dissuades rule-breaking behavior. "The dynamic between internal capabilities, ensconced in speci c identities and organizational structures, and the external knowledge in the market (network) drives a co-evolution between the emergent properties in the rm and the network" (Kogut, 2000, p. 412) Herein lies a fundamental trade-o between organizational stability and variety in network structure. The emergent network properties, as discussed above, are the result of self-organization processes and the accumulation of social capital among partners. The accumulation of social capital is dependent on the maintenance and strengthening of the prevailing relationships. The requisite investment by individual organizations to build social capital naturally tends to create forces for the preservation and strengthening of the existing structures. Hence, a natural tendency emerges to freeze the structure of interactions into stable patterns. The more stable the patterns of interaction become, however, the more the characteristics of rm organization the network acquires; that is, the more it strives for specialization and the less capable it grows in achieving its fundamental objective: variety. Increasing coordination deprives individual partners of the ability to pursue potential avenues of exploration.
NETWORK STRUCTURE OPTIMALITY
Latching onto this fundamental trade-o , Walker et al. (1997) emphasized that it is exactly the tendency for preservation and reinforcement of network structures that generates opportunities for entrepreneurial agents to bridge across structures. In so doing, these agents pro t individually, as well as alter the form of the network. The argument for network structure optimality is about balancing two opposing forces: the incentive to lower GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11739 -EE -MALERBA:M1842 -MALERBA TEXT GRA the operating cost in a network by facilitating information exchange and decreasing relational risk, versus the incentive of pro t opportunities by breaking new ground to bridge stable but isolated regions of relationships in the network.
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This "entrepreneurial" activity is, of course, the selective establishment of information-rich ties across "structural holes" in the network, a concept that Burt (1992) has strongly advocated. Such ties are non-redundant in the sense that they connect previously unconnected nodes and, as a result, confer powerful brokerage positions. Firms positioned in structural holes are more powerful because they arbitrate the information ows between groups of rms with loose (or no) ties to each other. The rent in this situation accrues to the rm bridging the structural hole. Pushing the argument a bit further, it can be proposed that while there can be entrepreneurial agents from within the network that bridge the holes, it is more likely that there is an inverse relationship between network centrality and such entrepreneurship taking hold. The smaller the stake of an organization in a given network, the higher are its incentives to play the entrepreneurial role and bridge across. The highest possibilities for the entrepreneurial role thus rest with organizations at the network fringes or outside of the network altogether.
Such "entrepreneurial" activity contrasts with the style of networking involved in the closure argument for dense network structures based on solid amounts of social capital that Coleman (1988) had advocated earlier. In Coleman's world, redundant ties among rms resolve collective action problems and improve coordination. Here, the rent accrues to the group and is allocated among its members on the basis of relative market power and adjudication rules.
Seemingly contradictory, the two styles of networking may actually be complementary, as Burt (1998) has already suggested, providing different advantages to, and being used for di erent purposes by, rms and other actors. One could perceive the Burt style of networking as creating a counterbalance to the natural tendency for freezing patterns of interorganizational ties in the Coleman style of networking. In other words, Burt's style of networking could play a safeguarding role against the progressive demise of variety in increasingly stable networks.
The question, then, becomes one of balance (optimality).
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That is, a balance that allows for the advantages of stability, when it proves advantageous, and also allows for the recombination of information and (network) renewal, when that path has merits. Economists will quickly recognize the analogy with traditional market analysis: (network) entry and barriers to such entry become key factors for network structure and its rejuvenation, exactly as they do in markets where entrants dilute the GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11739 -EE -MALERBA:M1842 -MALERBA TEXT strongholds of incumbents. Similarly to achieving optimality in markets, achieving balance in networks will be complex and will vary across activity areas (e.g. sectors).
Optimality in this sense is di cult to achieve, not least because of the "emergent" properties of network structure. The solution will, at least in part, depend on whether the predominant mode of operation in a sector concentrates on the better exploitation of existing technologies, skills, and information, or the exploration of emerging innovations and other changes (March, 1991) . Generally speaking, exploitation signi es improvement of established practices whereas exploration signi es the development of new practices. Intimately related to the achievement of economic e ciency (lower cost for given output or more output for given cost), exploitation requires organizational routines that, in the case of networks, can be de ned as, "repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, involving multiple actors" (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 96) . That is, exploitation involves the use of existing information to improve e ciency and returns from present strategies, competencies, and procedures. In contrast, routines are subject to change in exploration. Exploration involves searching for and experimenting with emerging innovations with good future prospects of pro tability.
It is reasonable to anticipate that both processes are often needed, pursued simultaneously, and compete for limited resources within individual organizations (March, 1991) . 6 The ensuing strategic trade-o is a classic one in economics. It pits short-term investment in the re nement of existing technologies for immediate, but relatively low-margin returns, against longer-term investment in radically new ideas and technologies for future, but potentially much higher-margin, returns. The optimal allocation of resources between the two will depend on the internal conditions of the rm (resources, capabilities, strategic inclination) and on environmental factors relating to both the demand side (conditions for market development) and the supply side (technological opportunity, appropriability, competitive conditions). Environmental uncertainty will tend to push for more exploration by increasing the need for innovation. According to this line of argument, then, the type and optimal amount of social capital for an organization to maintain will change in accordance with the distinct strategic mixtures of exploitation and exploration pursued by that organization in di erent environments (Nooteboom and Gilsing, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000) .
On the basis of the di erent information requirements between exploitation and exploration, Rowley et al. (2000) have argued for high-density and strong ties for exploitation and for low-density and weak ties for exploration. Strong ties are said to facilitate rich exchanges of ne-grained information to assist rms in obtaining a deep understanding of a speci c innovation in order to re ne and improve it. Weak ties are said to be especially important for exibility and low-density network structures preferable for broad searches in uncertain environments requiring relatively high investments in exploration. Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) reach the opposite conclusion: it is dense networks and redundant ties that may be conducive to experimentation and learning through contacts and not strict rules of network e ciency maximization. They reason on the basis of bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1964; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Simon, 1957) . In the context of dynamic environments with frequently changing conditions and continuous learning by companies, they argue, the e ciency of information transfer through bridges across existing local networks -while avoiding duplication of contacts -becomes less relevant as a realistic strategy. In dynamic environments characterized by rapid technological advance, openness of contacts, network density and tie redundancy are said to be preferable to e ciency-based behavior. Nooteboom and Gilsing (2004) argue somewhere in between. Loose and non-redundant ties may be best for the identi cation of knowledge, whereas strong ties are needed for the transfer of complex and highly tacit knowledge. On the basis of bounded rationality and uncertainty concerning future dominant designs of technology, organization, and consequential con guration of future networks of exploitation, they expect dense networks and redundant ties in the case of exploration. Ties will be strong in some respects (scope, frequency, trust/mutual openness), show less strength in terms of relation-speci c investments and duration, and little strength in terms of control. In contrast, less dense, more stable network structures and non-redundant ties are anticipated for exploitation. Increased specialization, reduced scope and reduced need for trust (more control) reduce frequency of interaction.
Moreover, Nooteboom and Gilsing (2004) discuss the important issue of the transition from exploration to exploitation with the development of a dominant design. They expect hybrid forms of networks to arise in transitions between, and through, combinations of exploration and exploitation. One theoretically possible form of hybrid network could be visualized as an intermediate network that links networks for exploitation and networks for exploration. Another form could be represented by a core network of exploitation connected to peripheral networks of exploration. Finally, exploration networks may be transformed into exploitation networks with larger scale organizations, elimination of redundancy, emergence of centrality, larger speci c investments, less informality, fewer personalized relations, more distrust and more formal control.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Several important concepts for the strategic and policy analysis of interorganizational innovation networks were discussed in this chapter. One relates to the network resources of rms. Like the social capital of individuals, network resources have a structural dimension determined by the location of an actor's contacts in a network, a relational dimension indicating their relationship assets such as trust/trustworthiness, and a cognitive dimension re ecting a shared paradigm that facilitates interaction in the network. Distinct from other rm-speci c resources, network resources reside in the formal and informal inter-organizational networks in which rms are embedded and can be utilized by the rm to conceive of and implement its strategies. Available network resources can in uence rms' strategic behavior by altering the opportunity set with which they are presented. The investments necessary to create and maintain network resources are distinct from the investments to create and maintain rmspeci c resources. Organizations are typically embedded in more than one inter-locking network at any given point of time.
Networks confer informational bene ts to their members that can be summarized as access, timing, and referrals. These informational bene ts ow through two channels: the direct ties of the organization (relational embeddedness) and its positioning in the network (structural embeddedness). Strong ties have been traditionally associated in the network literature with the exchange of high-quality, complex information and tacit knowledge, whereas weak ties have been considered appropriate means for accessing new information. Weak ties are more likely to serve as local bridges between relatively disconnected areas of the network, and to connect the agent with others that possess unique information. E ciency in accessing knowledge may improve by shedding redundant ties in favor of establishing selective ties that bridge "structural holes." Importantly, each participant's position in the network structure in uences its capabilities for bene ting from the network: more central positioning (locally or globally) generates visibility and reputation and facilitates timely access to resources and information. This, in turn, raises the status of the organization in the network and makes it especially desirable as a partner. Such "preferential attachment" processes lead to skewed distributions of linkages in networks of all kinds, including innovation networks.
When the knowledge underlying competitive advantage is widely distributed, inter-organizational cooperative networks become the locus of innovation. Organizations learn which collaborations to pursue, how to function in the context of multiple collaborative ventures, and how to adapt their cooperative strategies in the midst of dynamically evolving network structures. Such competencies become particularly important in high technology elds where frequent scienti c and technological advances change the relative bene ts of di erent forms of collaboration.
Networks also confer control bene ts for their members. Control bene ts are generated when rms are more advantageously positioned in the network or are part of a tightly knit network. A dense network structure with strong ties enables rms to build reputation and social capital in the form of trust and shared social norms across network members. Strong ties create trust at the dyadic level, while dense structures serve as mechanisms of norm creation at the network level. Dense networks and strong ties decrease the cost of network operation. Moreover, the stronger the ties and the denser the set of relationships, the more tightly knit is the network and the more it resembles an organization. The more it then tends to create its own culture that both enables and constrains interpretations and actions, and that includes relations of power and processes of exclusion for deterrence of deviant behavior. The dark side of dense networks is in the form of fewer degrees of freedom for members because of lock-in.
An important concept in the literature is that network structure is emergent in the initial conditions of a speci c industry, including the inherent characteristics of the relevant technologies, and the norms and institutional factors that help generate rules that guide the competitive/cooperative behavior of rms in that industry. In addition, it is now understood that the market and the network basically serve a similar purpose: achieving variety through specialization in the division of labor. In contrast, rms (hierarchies) enable specialization. The boundary between the hierarchy and the network is determined by transaction costs.
This points out a fundamental trade-o in network structure between organizational stability and variety. The accumulation of social capital is dependent on the maintenance and strengthening of the prevailing relationships; hence a tendency to freeze the structure of interactions into stable patterns. The more stable the patterns of interaction become, however, the more the characteristics of rm organization the network acquires; that is, the more it strives for specialization and the less capable it grows of achieving its fundamental objective of variety. Increasing coordination deprives individual partners of the ability to pursue potential avenues of exploration.
It is important to emphasize that network structure optimality will, at least in part, depend on whether the predominant mode of operation in an industry concentrates on the better exploitation of existing technologies, skills, and information, or the exploration of emerging innovations and other changes. Both processes are often needed, pursued simultaneously, and compete for limited resources within individual organizations. The optimal allocation of resources among the two will depend on the internal conditions of the rm (resources, capabilities, strategic inclination) and on environmental factors relating to industry characteristics, including both the demand side (conditions for market development) and the supply side (technological opportunity, appropriability, competitive conditions). The type and optimal amount of social capital for an organization to maintain will then change in accordance with the organization's strategic mixture of exploitation and exploration in di erent environments.
On the basis of the di erent information requirements between exploitation and exploration, analysts have argued for high-density and strong ties for exploitation and for low-density and weak ties for exploration. Others have reached the opposite conclusion by using bounded rationality arguments: in dynamic environments with frequently changing conditions and continuous learning by companies, the e ciency of transferring information through bridges in existing networks while avoiding duplication of contacts is argued to become less relevant than openness of contacts, network density and tie redundancy. Still others argue somewhere in between: dense networks, redundant ties, and variable tie strengths are expected in the case of exploration; less dense, more stable network structures and non-redundant ties are anticipated for exploitation. Moreover, hybrid network forms are anticipated in transitions from exploration to exploitation in the development of a dominant design.
We have thus come full circle: in order to determine the incentives (net bene ts) of a rm to participate in a network, one needs to address network structure optimality and the rm's positioning in the network which, in turn, requires addressing the relationship between industry (activity) characteristics and rm strategy. This should not be surprising, given that networking is part of the more general strategic orientation of the rm, which itself is in uenced by the characteristics of the economic activity in which the rm is engaged in the rst place. In other words, network analysis must be complemented with more traditional investigations of market structure, technological advance, competitive behavior, and company performance. A particularly promising, in our view, avenue of investigation that can combine all these aspects would be the analysis of the co-evolution of industry and network structure, especially in sectors of rapid technological advance.
NOTES
1. This process is often called preferential attachment. Let P(k) be the probability that a randomly selected node has k links (degrees). It is commonly found in the literature that,
